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Abstract

Behavioral economics has played a fundamental role historically in innovation in economic
institutions, even long before behavioral economics was recognized as a discipline. Examples
from history, notably that of the invention of workers’ compensation, illustrate this point.
Though scholarly discussion develops over decades, actual innovation tends to occur
episodically, particularly at times of economic crisis. Fortunately, some of the major professional
societies, the Verein fÃr Sozialpolitik, the American Economic Association and their successors,
have managed to keep a broad discourse going, involving a variety of research methods
including some that may be described today as behavioral economics, thereby maintaining an
environment friendly to institutional innovation. Further, the broad expansion of behavioral
economics that is going on today can be expected to yield even more such important institutional
innovations.
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Behavioral Economics and Institutional Innovation 1
Behavioral economics, which is really the application of methods from other social sciences &
particularly psychology & to economics, is central to institutional innovation because it rounds
out the details, the frictions or imperfections that might make some grand idea for a new
economic institution unworkable, if not appropriately dealt with.
The invention of economic institutions is not unlike engineering inventions: it must deal
with a multitude of problems and obstacles, including the problem that the people who must use
the invention are themselves imperfect. What engineers call "human factors engineering" is
especially important in the invention of economic institutions.
In this paper I will consider a little history of thought in both fields, behavioral and
institutional economics together, from the perspective of their contribution to some of our most
important social welfare institutions, institutions that help people manage the risks of living. I
will trace the interaction of practical policy with economic thought extending back to the
beginnings of modern social welfare institutions in 19th century Germany, up to the present. The
example of the invention of workers’ compensation will be particularly stressed as it affords a
perfect example of the interplay between economic theory and behavioral economics in
producing fundamental economic innovation. I hope this will offer some insights into the way
that progress is made in economic policy, through the interaction of economic thought and the
experimentation of social policy makers.
Behavioral Economics
We divide the social sciences according to subject matter but also according to method. We
might define the field of economics in terms of subject matter as the study of prices, quantities,
resource allocation and economic organization. But we might also define the field of economics
as it mostly exists today as a certain approach to social science, an approach that is based models
of rational optimization, and in particular, of individuals’ maximizing an expected utility
function.
Unfortunately, the division of the social sciences by subject matter does not neatly match
with the division according to method. The method of modeling rational optimization is not
coterminous with economics. Many other methods, including aspects of psychology, have long
been used by economists; I will cover some of this later. Moreover, non-economists often make
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use of the rational optimizing model. Political science has been heavily influenced by, some
would say over influenced by, rational optimizing models.2 The field of law has also had a great
reliance on the rational optimizing model ever since Ronald Coase’s work in the late 1950s, and
the founding then of the Journal of Law and Economics. Some would say too that the field of
law was over-influenced by the rational optimizing model.3
The study of prices, quantities and economic organization does not completely succeed if
conducted only from the paradigm of rational optimization. There is increasing recognition of
this fact. A behavioral economics revolution has been taking place, a revolution that has
accelerated over the last ten or twenty years.
Herbert Simon, in his entry “behavioral economics” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and Law, 1998, pointed out that the term “behavioral economics” is a sort of
pleonasm, for what else is economics about than a study of human behavior. How could it
possibly be that all the work done in departments of psychology, sociology and anthropology are
irrelevant to economics? The discovery of behavioral economics in the past decade or two is
really a return to reality from an untenable position that the rational optimizing model is the only
framework for economics.
Another revolution in economics has been taking place that is not usually associated with
the behavioral economics revolution, and that is the institutional economics. It becomes related
when on looks at the defining characteristics of the two fields. One of the cardinal principles of
behavioral economics, as enunciated by its most important exponents Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, is framing, that human actions are heavily influenced by frames of reference. The
institutional structure that we have is the basic framework for all of our economic decisions.
All academic disciplines proceed by fits and starts, and a new paradigm, once adopted, tends
to be carried too far, until earlier research assumptions are rediscovered. The exclusively reliance
of many in the economic profession on the rational optimizing model was an example of carrying
a model too far. Thus we are seeing the emerging fields of what are called behavioral economics,
and the “new institutional economics,” that are really returns to a more balanced approach to all
of economics.
One signpost of a revolution in economics is the founding of new societies and journals. The
Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics was founded in 1982. The International
Society for New Institutional Economics was founded in 1997. Other evidence can be found in
the creation of new scholarly journals. The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization was
created in 1980. The Journal of Economic Psychology was created in 1981. The Journal of
Behavioral Finance was created in 1999 (under a slightly different title at first). The Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics began in 1997 (as a transformation of an earlier German
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journal), and in the same year the Review of Economic Design appeared.
But, the founding of societies and the establishment of journals does not accurately represent
progress in the fields, for creative research is always directed by individual researchers, not
organizations. There appears to be something to be gained by people of similar research methods
coming together to talk with each other, but there is also the risk that by defining themselves as a
separate group they will lose their vitality and lose their ability to interact constructively with the
profession at large.
Behavioral economics and institutional economics represent two distinct branches of
economic theory that are often viewed as not central to economic theory, and have gone through
periods of revival and discard over the history of economic thought. Behavioral economics has
long been regarded as not very successful by many in the profession, for it has not produced an
elegant theoretical framework that is readily applied to a wide variety of circumstances.
Institutional economic has been criticized as little more than simple story telling about our
existing economic institutions and off-the-wall proposals for the future. But, despite their
frequent disparagement, these fields thrive in their ability to make institutional innovation
happen.
Economic Crisis as an Instigator of Institutional Innovation
Economic research is a fairly steady enterprise, but major institutional innovation is not.
Those who would like to see their economic theories embodied in new institutions may have to
wait many years to see that happen. One reason that innovation seems so episodic is that it tends
to be spurred by major economic crises, and can take place only in the rare times when the public
perceives an urgent need for change.
Sometimes economic crisis can be so pressing as to bring economic innovation on even
before the theorists have opined on it. An example is the invention of inflation-indexed bonds in
early America, when the erosion of soldiers’ pay by wartime inflation was so intense and so
resented that it actually created some mutinies among American soldiers. But in such cases, the
innovation, not fully worked out or justified in theory, may be abandoned as soon as the crisis is
over. Inflation-indexed bonds were not issued again in the U.S. until 1997.4
The American Economic Association was founded by practical economists who were
motivated in some measure by the industrial depression of the 1870s. A period of irrational
exuberance and overbuilding of railroads after the Civil War had led to a stock market crash (the
panic of 1873) and a period of massive unemployment, by far the longest contraction (from
1873-9) in the NBER chronicle of business cycle dates.
5

The principal scholarly work of that time that dealt with the policy towards this depression
was written not by a professor but by a journalist: Henry George. His 1879 book Progress and
Poverty was long on proposals for institutional change but a little short on a factual basis in
scholarship. Henry George had only 5 months of secondary schooling before joining the
publishing industry at age 16, and he wrote in a loose and impressionistic manner. He did have a
keen appreciation of the possibility of improving welfare by changing economic institutions (in
his case, to convert the tax system to a single tax on land) and his beginning was an inspiration to
many.
The intense public reaction to George’s proposal to solve the problem of poverty attendant
upon industrial depression both inspired and created hostility from academic economists. The
simplicity of George’s ideas repelled academic economists, but the sudden appearance of a
public apparently willing to make major changes in economic institutions inspired them.
The American Economic Association was founded to provide a more scientific and scholarly
approach to the same questions that George addressed. A New York Times article in 1886, the
year after the founding of the American Economic Association in Saratoga New York, describes
the new Association:
They do not mean to rest content with theoretical discussions of political science, but
hope to achieve practical results. They believe that the industrial problem is the one
which presses the most urgently for solution, and that while it remains unanswered
there can be no security and no real progress. By careful and candid consideration of it
at this stage they hope to avert catastrophes which they think must come if it is left
untouched.5
One might compare the mission of the Southern Economic Association, founded much later,
in 1927.The Association was not founded at a time of economic crisis, but the Southern
Economic Journal was, in 1933, the bottom of the greatest depression this country had ever
faced. The lead article by Tipton Snavely in the first issue of the Southern Economic Journal
describes the kind of scholarship that sets the example for this Association as the works of the
southerners (as well as U.S. presidents in their day): Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and
James Monroe.6 These people responded to a crisis (the discord between the United Kingdom
and its American colonies that led to the Revolutionary War) by becoming some of the most
profound inventors of economic institutions in world history: Jefferson was the author of the
Declaration of Independence, and Madison was one of the authors of the Federalist Papers that
set forth a theory of democratic government that shapes world institutions today, and he has been
called the father of the U.S. Constitution. All three of them were interested in economics and
helped guide the curricula of the southern universities that were in formation then.
6

Even before the founding of these associations, similar changes in response to crisis were
happening in Europe. The very first national social insurance programs were instituted by the
German government led by Otto von Bismarck in the 1880s. The German government created
health insurance (Krankenversicherung) in 1883, followed by accident insurance
(Unfallversicherung) in 1884 and old age insurance (Altersversicherung) in 1889. These
institutions were then copied around the world. Indeed, the Social Security institutions that we
have in the United States today are very similar to those instituted in Germany in the 1880s.
The German social insurance is often described as recommended to Bismarck by his
economic advisors, including Johann Karl Rodbertus and Hermann Wagener, as a response to the
threat of the emerging socialist and communist movements. The 1848 Revolution, which started
in Sicily and spread to France, Germany, Italy and Austro-Hungary, had made a strong
impression of the potential dangers an angry proletariat posed to the established order. The
Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels was written in that same year, and
helped launch an international Communist movement. These events undoubtedly led to a motive
for established governments to preempt these revolutionary movements by improving the
economic lot of the poorer element of society. A social insurance system would impress upon
them the benevolence of their government and create public support for the state. To use
Bismarck’s own words, workers will think "if the state comes to any harm, I’ll lose my
pension."7
Bismarck himself was hardly interested in social insurance and embraced the social
insurance programs suggested to him because of their apparent political expedience. He did not
even bother to mention the birth of social insurance in his memoirs. It appears to be the academic
discussion of options for social welfare that laid the groundwork for the innovations, and this
public discussion had aspects of recognition of modern principles of behavioral economics, that
it designed social welfare institutions around these principles.
It remains to be seen whether the crisis of globalization, and the pressures of the emerging
economies on the United States, will be sufficient to generate this kind of response.
Importance of Economic Discourse Generated by Crisis
There is evidence that there were some more fundamental reasons than simple political
expedience for Germany’s invention of social insurance in the 1880s. One of these is an
inventive spirit and public discussion that led to the details of the social insurance plans.
In the 1870s and 1880s, there was widespread public and scholarly discussion of the "social
question" (soziale Frage), no doubt at least partly in response to the communist threat. People
7

wanted to know a moderate response to the same issues that motivated the communists. The
German equivalent of the American Economic Association (Verein für Sozialpolitik) was
founded in 1872.
In the second half of the nineteenth century in Germany, there were also some of the finest
university economics departments in the world, where the social issues of the day were debated.
At that time there was in contrast relatively little academic economics in the United States8 and
the economists the U. S. did have near the end of the nineteenth century tended to be products of
German universities. Historian Daniel Rodgers notes that:
Of initial 6 officers of the American Economic Association in 1885, 5 had studied in
Germany, of its first 26 presidents, at least 20 had done so.
In 1906, when Yale’s Henry Farnum polled what he took to be the 116 leading
economists and social scientists in the US and Canada, 59 had spent a student year or
more in Germany.9
The American Economic Association in its early years was actually often described as an
exponent of German economics. The person most responsible for founding the American
Economic Association, Richard T, Ely, felt that the parallel between the American Economic
Association had become so strong that it needed to be corrected:
Dr. Ely also maintained that the proposed association ought in no sense to be regarded
as a German movement, as some had intimated. Nothing about it was more marked than
its American character. It had sprung up almost spontaneously to answer to felt needs.
Doubtless many present had studied in Germany and were grateful for what they had
learned in the German universities; but nothing was more foreign to their purposes than
to import Germany into America.10
The German economics departments were much involved in advancing social causes, and
their relative advantage in understanding economic theory was a critical factor making possible
the creation of social insurance.
Germany in the late 19th century was also the country most on the move in terms of
scientific research. Germany invented then the modern concept of a graduate school, where
doctoral students would work with professors on fundamental research. Germany, in the 1870s,
invented the modern concept of an in-house research laboratory within a corporation, an
invention of a way of inventing that was later widely copied in other countries.11 While these inhouse departments were probably not the venue for most discussions of social insurance, the kind
of intellectual environment they represented apparently carried forward in many directions in
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German society. In many ways the vitality of our economics profession today has to do with
copying educational institutions from Germany.
Information Technology
The other cause of the creation of national social insurance in the 1880s are a number of
inventions in information technology, in the information infrastructure, that made much more
feasible the ambitious social insurance plans. Some of the Nineteenth Century innovations were:
the invention of cheap paper, of preprinted forms in books with carbon paper between them, of
typewriters, of vertical filing cabinets. We are not talking about computers here, but instead
about the simple methods of keeping track of people, maintaining their records, and following a
social insurance program methodically.
In Germany, notably, an efficient government bureaucracy stood out, with its system of
management as well as professionalism among its employees was already an example for the
entire world by the 1880s. Germany was an example of government professionalism for the
entire world.
The nineteenth century also saw the development of the first modern and efficient postal
services. The cost of mailing a letter declined sharply, and post offices proliferated into every
town and village. The German postal service was one of the most advanced, and it became a
financial conduit through postal savings. The postal service became the information
infrastructure for the age, the Internet of the 19th century, so to speak.
The kind of economic innovation that was seen in Germany in the 1880s would probably not
have been possible in earlier centuries: the cost of accurate record keeping, record transmittal and
funds transfer would have been prohibitive then.
The Origin of Social Insurance: Workers’ Compensation as an Invention
Workers’ compensation is a good example of a radical invention in social welfare since in
most countries, including the United States, it was historically the first major government social
insurance scheme to be put in place. In fact, according to Arthur Williams who did an extensive
study of workers’ compensation around the world, workers’ compensation was the first social
insurance program for 106 of 136 countries.12 It was the first because it, as an invention, had a
clear logic and functioning, and thus stood to be copied.
Workers’ Compensation (workman’s compensation) is the U.S. version of the German
accident insurance, a government-mandated accident, disability and life insurance program that
9

applies only to work-related events, work-related injuries illnesses and deaths. After worker’s
compensation began in Germany in 1884 as an initiative of the it was copied by Poland in the
same year, and by 1900 it had spread to 11 countries.13 By 1988, all but five of 141 countries had
some form of workers’ compensation.14 Even the Soviet Union, with a very different ideology
from the countries where workers’ compensation began, adopted a workers’ compensation that
was not fundamentally different.
Workers’ compensation is an institution that reduces risks to livelihoods, but deals only with
a subset of risks, the risks that are work-related. One naturally wonders what is the essence of
the idea that has been so widely copied. One wonders why work-related injuries should be given
a separate program from a general welfare program, and why the programs stop short of dealing
with the bigger issues of lifetime income risk management.
In the United States, after the turn of the century, the workers’ compensation cause was led
by economists Richard T. Ely and John R. Commons, both professors at the University of
Wisconsin and founders of the American Economics Association. At that time, the U.S. federal
government was not considered the proper authority for social welfare institutions, and so the
idea had to be sold individually to each of the state governments. Wisconsin and New York led
the way by adopting workers’ compensation in 1911. By 1920, all but six states had adopted it,
and by 1948 all states had.15
We must try to understand the essence of this institution in order to appreciate the reasons
for its near-universality. It is a sort of "invention" that has an internal logic and substance, so that
its spread is not unlike the spread of technology in other areas. It allows a kind of risk
management that had not been possible before. The elements of the invention, in its original
1884 form in Germany as well as many successor versions, are several. The 1884 law set up new
mutual associations for each industry in Germany, and for large industries several mutual
associations. The law also set up a government-financed imperial office (in Berlin) that regulated
these associations. The law specified that firms were required to pay an assessment to their
respective mutual association, from which compensation for workers’ claims would be made. A
definition of events that are presumed to be work-related was drawn up, to be the basis of claims.
Claims would be automatically paid if the event satisfied the definition, whether or not there was
fault on the part of the employer.
The workers’ compensation system replaced an older model in which employees’ only
recourse when they were injured at work was to sue their employer. The old system seemed to
work very poorly for a number of reasons. In many injuries, it was difficult to prove fault on the
part of the employer. Lawyers might argue that the employer’s working conditions were such as
to make such an injury more probable than it should be, but such arguments are often too
10

intangible a basis on which to predicate a huge award. Sometimes affixing blame on an employer
requires testimony from other employees, who might be reluctant to testify against their
employer. Lump-sum awards for permanent disability would have to be very large to
compensate for lifetime disabilities, and firms may find it difficult to pay in some circumstances.
Firms cannot be guaranteed to continue making regular payments indefinitely; firms do not last
forever. Before workers’ compensation, the lawsuit often failed to produce a sizable settlement,
and the worker thus suffered a catastrophic decline in living standards, leading even sometimes
to a life of beggary.
The invention of workers’ compensation allows a certain spreading of risk that had not been
possible before. By mandating the program for all firms, the law eliminated the selection bias
problem (that only firms that had inside knowledge that working conditions were relatively more
dangerous would sign up for insurance against workers’ judgments against them). By defining an
objective list of work-related events for compensation, without regard to fault, the law eliminated
the problem that fault was difficult to prove. By creating long-lived organizations, the mutual
associations or their equivalent, the government made it possible for workers to be compensated
in the long-term even though firms were irregular and transitory in their ability to pay.
The essential element of this invention of workers’ compensation is a formal definition of
"work-related" injuries or illnesses that is the basis of claims. Arriving at this definition would
appear to be the most difficult step in implementing workers’ compensation, and the issues make
the definition so ambiguous that one wonders why relation to work should be an issue in a
government-sponsored insurance plan.
While it is clearly possible to identify an accident in which a worker is crushed by a
machine as work related, more often the source of the injury or illness is hard to pin down.
Repetitive work can bring on arthritis, but most people who live long enough get arthritis
eventually anyway. Should arthritis be covered? Wouldn’t that bring on a flood of claims from
people experiencing normal age-related arthritis? Back problems are sometimes work related, but
back problems are very common among the general population. Isn’t there a risk of a large
number of claims that work brought on a back problem?
What if a worker falls ill with an infectious disease following a minor injury at work. Should
we suppose that the injury made the worker vulnerable to the disease? Should mental illnesses or
stress-related conditions be covered? Jobs may produce psychological stress that arguably could
be held responsible. Heart and lung disease may be worsened by atmosphere, and many
workplaces have some at least minor problems with atmosphere.
By working out answers to these questions, Germany created a model for an economic
institution, something that could be copied with relative ease in other countries. In this sense,
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there was a great deal of research and development that led to workers’ compensation, it was a
real invention.
One wonders why the government should make such a point of trying to decide whether an
injury or illness is work related. Part of the reason must be the employee lawsuits against
employers for work-related injuries and illnesses, for which the same ambiguities have to be
worked out by courts in a context of fault-finding and case-specific arguments. A sequence of
judgments on individual cases is probably not the best way to arrive at systematic judgments on
definition of work-related injury or illness. An invention does not have to be perfect to be
adopted widely, it has only to be the best available technology.
There are very good reasons for adopting something like workers’ compensation, and this
must account for its spread. These reasons for workers’ compensation do not, however, explain
why the compensation is limited to work-related injuries, and why it is usually financed by
employers’ contributions. Some accounts of the reasons to have workers’ compensation
separately from a general social insurance scheme are unconvincing:
Two possible reasons for this special treatment [for work-related injuries] are that (1)
the nation believes that employers and society have a greater obligation to workers
injured or exposed to disease because of their work, and (2) the WC benefit may be the
exclusive remedy of the employee against the employer for job-related injuries or
diseases.16
It is hard to see why workers are so different from nonworkers in terms of society’s obligations
that we need to have a separate program for them, and the workers’ compensation benefit does
not need to be the exclusive remedy of the employee. The weakness of these arguments leads one
to wonder if the existence of workers’ compensation as a program separate from other
government illness or disability insurance is nothing more than a historical accident, caused by
the fact that pressing and widely observed problems with employee lawsuits against employers
caused workers’ compensation to be the first social insurance program to be created, and the
institutions have just lived on since.
There is, however, an important reason why workers’ compensation financed by employers’
contributions is an important invention that is different from other forms of social insurance:
such a program, if the rates are related to the employer’s or industry experience with workplace
illness and injury, creates proper incentives for employers to reduce the riskiness of their work
environment. It is perhaps for this reason that workers’ compensation is best thought of as a
separate invention, apart from other kinds of social insurance. One might also argue that
employer contributions that are somehow related to experience with injuries or illnesses related
to the employer is an essential element of the invention of workers’ compensation, without which
12

it would not work well. If we institute worker’s compensation without relating contributions to
loss experience, then we would create incentives for even worse workplace conditions than were
there before it. Employers would become encouraged to allow workplace safety to deteriorate
even further, since the cost of injury and illness would be subsidized by the insurance program.
John R. Commons, a tireless campaigner for workers’ compensation in the United States,
referred to this effect of workers’ compensation by the term "the internalization principle," the
principle that society should impose whenever possible all costs that firms cause for society onto
the firms themselves, so that firms will have an incentive to contain these costs, thereby
"internalizing" costs that were formerly borne externally to the firm. Commons noted that many
turn-of-the-century workplaces had dangerous conditions for the workers, that workers would
occasionally incur a disabling injury at work. With worker’s compensation, firms have an
incentive to make the workplace really safer, and not just to create an appearance of safety
enough that lawsuits against them could not prove they caused the accident.
The original German Unfallversicherung was in fact a model for creating such an incentive.
Since the 1884 law specified a separate mutual association to insure the risks of each industry,
higher insurance premia would be assessed on firms in industries that pose high risks to their
workers. Ultimately, these higher insurance premia would be passed on to consumers of their
products through higher prices. It is efficient that consumers pay the full costs (including costs of
injury to workers) and decide whether the product is attractive to them at that price; if it is not the
industry does not justify the risk to injury.
Commons internalization principle was an effective argument; it appealed to state
legislators, who would respond by adopting mandatory workers’ compensation programs.
Commons was not successful in his proposal for health insurance, which did not have the
internalization principle behind it.
In the United States workers’ compensation systems today, employers may be class-rated,
experience-rated, or retrospectively rated. Class rated employers are assigned to one of over 600
industrial classes, and then see their premium depend on the injuries and illness experience of
others in their class. Class rating is used for small employers, who are too small for it to be
possible to estimate their injury and illness rates accurately. The experience-rated or
retrospectively-rated employers see their premium depend on their own actual loss experience.
Some states also allow schedule rating, which adjusts the employer’s premium with regard to
safety programs and other factors believed to affect future losses. In 45 states, employers may
also choose to purchase insurance privately. The alternatives incorporated into this system are
designed to have a very effective link between premiums paid by a firm and its actual loss
experience, thus internalizing the losses firms create very effectively.
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In Japan, the Workmen’s Accident Compensation Program divides employers into 54
categories, and employer contribution rates differ dramatically across categories, from 14.5
percent for firms constructing hydroelectric power plants, to 0.1 percent for firms in banking and
insurance.
Not all countries have an effective link between losses and premiums. A notable example is
the United Kingdom, where their industrial injuries scheme does not make contributions vary
according to either employers’ industry or individual firm experience. However, the United
Kingdom is a country where workers are allowed to sue employers for damages even though they
are compensated by workers’ compensation, and so this defect of their system is not as serious as
it would otherwise be.17
Behavioral Economics and the Invention of Mandatory Social Welfare
When national social insurance was invented in the 1880s, German social thinkers, such as
Adolph Wagner and G. Behm, were arguing that national social insurance should be made
mandatory, to deal with, the problem that few people would actually buy the insurance, a
problem that is ultimately behavioral.
There are many complex reasons grounded in human behavior why social insurance needs to
be mandatory.
The "risk as feelings" hypothesis is the product of research in clinical and physiological
psychology. It asserts that emotional reactions to situations involving uncertainty or futurity
often differ sharply from cognitive assessments of those situations, and that when such
differences occur, it is often the emotional reactions that determine behavior.18 Rational
optimizing economic theory assumes that people calculate their rational advantage and then act
consistently with that. In fact, it is a common human shortcoming that actions to put in actions
one’s rational decisions are often postponed or neglected.
The hyperbolic discounting theory that was developed by David Laibson helps us to
quantify an important human tendency: a tendency to postpone consideration of important
problems indefinitely. People violate the precepts of rational optimizing theory by displaying
time inconsistency, repeatedly violating their own plans for the future.
The theory of mental compartments developed by Richard Thaler helps us to understand
why people may be very cautious to protect themselves against some small, even
inconsequential, risks, and to ignore some of the biggest lifetime risks of all.
The research on "wishful thinking bias" has demonstrated that people really do tend
sometimes to believe what they want to believe. They may then disregard some important risks,
14

not deal with them. For example, soccer enthusiasts overestimate the probability that their team
will win19 and supporters of political candidates give overestimate the probability that their
candidate will win.20
While these are modern research results, the ideas were anticipated in the discussions that
led to the establishment of nineteenth century social welfare institutions. That the social
insurance should be made compulsory emerged as a central theme. In many countries, there were
already voluntary help self-help, benevolent societies and insurance companies. By making the
government plans compulsory, the government solved the selection bias problem that plagued
private insurance plans, and they solved the problem that some individuals, of lesser intelligence,
discipline or foresight, will omit to buy insurance and then, after a bad outcome, throw
themselves at the mercy of others. The social insurance replaced or supplemented the poor laws,
which had until then offered some support for the most unlucky, but not on the basis of
insurance, that is, out of sympathy and without regard for prior contributions or contractual
coverage.
The argument for making plans compulsory hinged partly on some recognitions of
limitations of human ability to tackle risk management. G. Behm, in his 1874 paper for the
Society for Social Politics (Verein für Sozialpolitik), noted that
From my experiences, I have to say it is very doubtful that any substantial number of
workers would on their own sign up for a pension plan.21
Fritz Halle, a businessman, in another paper collected in the same 1874 volume, offered his
interpretation of the reasons workers gave for not wanting insurance. The worker would say,
Halle quotes:
As long as I am alive I can earn my bread, from the little that I can now save, I cannot
also afford contributions for insurance, and should I die young, which surely won’t
happen as I am strong and healthy, the community would take care of my wife and
children.22
Halle says that such statements reveal a "deficiency of foresight and a deficiency of concern for
heirs."23 Such statements appear to reflect a number of judgment errors that twentieth century
psychologists have studied closely: overconfidence, underestimation of low probability risks, and
myopia about not-so-near future.
Part of the reason that individuals would not buy insurance is that they feel that they are
already protected from extreme vicissitudes by their family and friends, who would help them
out then if anything went seriously wrong. This feeling was surely also largely an illusion, or
15

wishful thinking. Friends will not appreciate the dimensions of economic hardship one may
encounter. Making the insurance compulsory creates a common knowledge among society in
general that the government has taken on the former role of the vaguely-defined community, and
so that they are freed from ill-defined obligations to take care of others. Compulsory social
insurance provides a clean break from the imperfect informal risk sharing.
The hopes, expressed in other many countries that voluntary associations would solve the
risk problem people faced were simply unrealistic. The benevolent societies and fraternal
organizations that were intrusted with the social welfare function before the German invention of
social insurance covered few people, and even these inadequately. Still, despite this evidence, it
was hard for social thinkers in the late nineteenth century to justify any mandatory plans, since
they seemed to run counter to principles of individual freedom. But after the German experiment
with social insurance in the 1880s, which revealed the benefits of such insurance, now virtually
every advanced country in the world has some form of social insurance. The advantages of
compulsory insurance has become so clear that the principle is accepted even in the societies that
value individual liberty the most.
Making social insurance mandatory deals with, as we would put it now, the selection bias
problem that hampers private insurance (only sick people would sign up for voluntary health
insurance, for example). The mandatory nature of social insurance makes it possible to keep
insurance down from levels that would discourage most potential applicants from buying
insurance (much as the analogous invention of group policies, such as corporate health insurance
policies, for the same reason, but with its own different problems).24
Mandatory social insurance was one of those difficult pills to swallow that delayed the
adoption of important social insurance innovations. But, when the arguments for it were made
persuasively enough, the innovations eventually did happen, and are now accepted by all shades
of political leanings, from the most conservative to the most liberal.
Gentler Alternatives to Mandatory Programs
Today, modern behavioral economics is suggesting new ways of encouraging better
economic decision making without necessarily making the plans mandatory. These new ways of
handling the problems that interfere with good decision making are grounded in behavioral
research, that is, in the barriers to individual success in economic decisions.
James Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian and Andrew Metrick (2003) have shown
evidence that in order to encourage better economic behavior we may have only to institute
economic institutions that make the good behavior the "default option." Most people let stand a
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default option that is suggested to them, and so merely setting up an institutional environment
that requires people to make a tiny effort to deviate from the default option can be enough to
encourage better economic decision making. As simple as this point seems to be, it has often
eluded government policy makers. One suspects that their failure to see this point is a
consequence of habitual over reliance on rational optimizing models of human behavior.
Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler (2004) have shown through some experiments that
people can be encouraged to save more if employers merely offer them a plan that specifies that
their a fraction of their future pay increases will be automatically diverted into a savings
program. By specifying that only future increases will be diverted, they make it easier for
individuals to sign up for the program, overcoming a tendency for people to procrastinate in their
savings decisions. By requiring that people make a little effort to cancel the program, they
succeeded in preventing most cancellations. Their programs resulted in a quadrupling of the
saving rate in 40 months, far more than any government tax incentives towards saving have
done, and with no mandatory provisions.
Richard Zeckhauser and Jeffrey Liebman (2004) have shown how complicated schedules,
such as schedules of tax rates relative to income, are a source of endless confusion to the general
public. Complicated schedules can sometimes be used to victimize the public, as for example by
cell phone companies that advertise low rates on calls made in accordance with a complex
schedule, and profit from customers’ failure to comprehend the schedule. But, at the same time, a
benevolent designer of economic institutions can use schedules to improve economic welfare by
changing the psychological salience of factors that might inhibit constructive economic behavior.
An example is the tax schedule involving the earned income tax credit, which encourages
unemployed people to find a job by offering a negative tax rate on the salient first income. The
earned income tax credit encourages them to make the psychologically difficult transition from
unemployment to work. At the same time, the high marginal tax rates on subsequent income are
apparently not noticed by most people, and do not operate as a deterrent to further work.
These, then, are concrete examples of behavioral economics offering us some real
institutional alternatives to mandatory programs, and alternatives that have the potential to
increase economic welfare.
Conclusion
Proposing major innovations in economic institutions is the most important way that economists
make lasting contributions to society. The major general economic societies in history, such as
the Verein fÃr Sozialpolitik and the American Economic Association, have over the years
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supported a broad spectrum of views on economic research and have encouraged fundamental
economic innovation. The recent shift in interests of economists towards behavioral economics
and institutional economics offers further hope that the economics profession can achieve more
such institutional change in the future.
But we have also seen that major changes in economic institutions often need to await an
economic crisis, some major exogenous event that makes the public ready to listen to ideas for
fundamental change and to accept such changes. Today, the. public may not be in the mood to
make big changes. Certainly, in the U.S. today it is not in the mood to see any changes that might
require an increase in taxes.
The biggest crisis that we are in today may be the war against terrorism, along with the
smouldering wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those events, whose impact goes far beyond the U.S.,
serve more to distract attention away from economic reform rather than bring attention to it.
There is also a possible worldwide economic crisis spurred by the rapid development of
emerging countries, most notably China and India, whose demand for the limited supplies of
energy and raw materials is suddenly soaring. The 2004 spike in oil prices to over $50 a barrel
was bordering on creating a world economic crisis, but it did not reach the proportions of the
crisis generated by the second oil crisis, in 1980, when real shortages of oil, and long lines at
gasoline stations, made a huge impression on the public. A public mood for fundamental
institutional change may yet come, but it has not happened yet.
Thus, despite some hopeful signs, we today may not be embarking in the immediate future
on a major new era of innovation in our economic institutions. But the kind of work that can lead
to real institutional innovation is something that economists ought to be doing continually.
Advancing our understanding of institutional innovation is an ongoing process, that takes years
and years. We as economists should not be deterred by the fact that we might have to wait years
to see some major innovations happen. We should be, over coming years, setting the groundwork
for major new innovations, in our own countries and around the world, biding our time until
these have a real chance to be implemented.
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4. See Shiller (2005).
5. "Practical Political Science," New York Times, Feb 28, 1886, p. 5.
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mortgage without obtaining the insurance.
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